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Artificial Surge Pricing as Price-Fixing: Why and How to Avoid It 
Cheska Tolentino* 
I. Introduction 
While rideshare affords drivers flexible work opportunities to supplement their income,1 it 
falls short of providing economic security for many drivers who rely on rideshare as their primary 
means of employment.2  Many drivers face poor pay, lack of legal protections, and an inability to 
take collective action to improve their working conditions.3  According to an independent survey, 
the median hourly wage for most respondents driving for UberX4 was between $13 and $15.5  
Another study published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reported that the median 
hourly rate was $8.55,6 slightly higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25.7  A Reno, Nevada, 
Uber driver claimed to have made $3.75 an hour “[a]fter gas, added monthly rideshare insurance, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.P.A., Columbia University School of International 
and Public Affairs; B.A., Oberlin College.  I would like to thank Professor Charles A. Sullivan, Associate Dean for 
Finance & Faculty, Seton Hall University School of Law, for his guidance and support as I wrote this comment.  I 
would also like to thank my husband Micah J. Desaire for his unwavering encouragement and thoughtfulness.  
1 Carson Kohler, 6 Uber Drivers Who Make Up to an Extra $450/Week Setting Their Own Hours, THE PENNY 
HOARDER (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.thepennyhoarder.com/make-money/side-gigs/how-much-you-make-driving-
with-uber/. 
2 Just over half of Uber drivers participating in an independent survey reported that driving for Uber was their only 
job.  JC, Ridester’s 2018 Independent Driver Earnings Survey, RIDESTER (Mar. 29, 2019), 
https://www.ridester.com/2018-survey/#introduction. 
3 Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber and Lyft Face an Existential Threat in California—And They’re Losing, THE VERGE (Sept. 
2, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/2/20841070/uber-lyft-ab5-california-bill-drivers-labor. 
4 UberX is Uber’s low-cost option.  What is UberX?, ESTIMATE FARE, https://estimatefare.com/what-is-uberx/ (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
5 JC, supra note 2.  
6 Sam Levin, Uber Drivers Often Make Below Minimum Wage, Report Finds, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/uber-lyft-driver-wages-median-report. 




wear-and-tear, constant oil changes and taxes.”8  Some full-time drivers have resorted to sleeping 
in their cars to make ends meet.9  Others are homeless.10  
Drivers’ primary legal roadblock to achieving better pay is their status as independent 
contractors.  As independent contractors, rideshare drivers have limited ability to negotiate better 
pay and working conditions with rideshare companies because they have no rights to collective 
action or bargaining under labor law.11  Despite the limitations resulting from their status as 
independent contractors, rideshare drivers have nonetheless engaged in self-help by informally 
banding together.12  Whereas surge pricing ordinarily occurs when the demand for rideshare 
exceeds supply,13 rideshare drivers artificially trigger surge pricing by simultaneously switching 
off, then switching on their rideshare apps.14  Their goal is simple: raise their pay.15 
This Comment explains that even though rideshare drivers justifiably desire higher pay, 
the potential legal and economic disadvantages of artificial surge pricing outweigh any short-term 
financial benefits for rideshare drivers.  First, artificial surge pricing arguably constitutes unlawful 
 
8 Michael Sainato, ‘I Made $3.75 an Hour’: Lyft and Uber Drivers Push to Unionize for Better Pay, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/22/uber-lyft-ipo-drivers-unionize-low-pay-
expenses.  Studies report different median hourly values because they use different methodologies to calculate pay 
and costs.  Levin, supra note 6. 
9 Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, When Their Shifts End, Uber Drivers Set Up Camp in Parking Lots Across the 
U.S., BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/when-their-shifts-end-
uber-drivers-set-up-camp-in-parking-lots-across-the-u-s. 
10 Carolyn Said, He Drives 60 Hours a Week for Uber.  He’s Still Homeless, SF CHRON. (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/amp/He-drives-60-hours-a-week-for-Uber-He-s-still-14457115.php.  
11 Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1740 
(2018).  Drivers are also limited by their ability to negotiate because they are contractually bound to arbitrate disputes.   
Carissa Laughlin, Arbitration Clause Issues in Sharing Economy Contracts, J. DISP. RESOL.197, 206-209 (2017).  In 
several cases, Uber has succeeded in enforcing arbitration against drivers.  Id.  But arbitration is not the focus of this 
comment. 
12 Minda Zetlin, Here's Why Uber and Lyft Drivers Are Artificially Creating Surge Prices, INC. (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/uber-lyft-drivers-artificial-surge-pricing-reagan-national-washington-arlington-
drive-united.html. 
13 Utpal M. Dholakia, Everyone Hates Uber’s Surge Pricing – Here’s How to Fix It, HAR. BUS. REVI. (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://hbr.org/2015/12/everyone-hates-ubers-surge-pricing-heres-how-to-fix-it. 
14 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Uber Drivers Are Reportedly Colluding to Trigger 'Surge' Prices Because They Say The 
Company Is Not Paying Them Enough, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 14, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-drivers-
artificially-triggering-surge-prices-reports-abc7-2019-6. 
15 Id.   
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restraint of trade under antitrust law.16  The practice would probably expose drivers and rideshare 
companies to legal liability.17  Second, because drivers cannot lawfully increase their pay through 
surge pricing or by negotiating with rideshare companies,18 rideshare will become a less attractive 
employment option.  This will exacerbate rideshare companies’ recruitment and retention 
problems.19  Finally, artificial surge pricing harms consumers by raising costs, diminishing price 
predictability,20 and reducing affordable transportation options.21  Rider dissatisfaction will 
negatively affect business for rideshare companies and drivers alike. 
This Comment proposes that the solution to artificial surge pricing is increasing driver 
compensation.  Boosting driver pay would allow rideshare companies to directly address drivers’ 
economic needs, avoid antitrust liability, and promote quality services for consumers.  Bolstering 
driver compensation should involve outright ramping up earnings, providing benefits, giving 
drivers the choice to work as either independent contractors or employees, or any combination of 
these possibilities.  This proposal would allow rideshare companies to somewhat preserve their 
independent contractor business model.  It would also give rideshare drivers the freedom to choose 
whether they want to continue taking advantage of the flexibility of working as independent 
contractors.  
 
16 See discussion infra Section IV(B). 
17 Id.  
18 Rideshare drivers “lack individual bargaining power vis-a-vis the platform companies and face bargaining 
disadvantages similar to those faced by employees in typical employment relationships.”  Marina Lao, Workers in the 
"Gig" Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018).  
But drivers’ inability to negotiate contract provisions is not the focus of this comment.  
19 Eliot Brown, Uber and Lyft Face Hurdle of Finding and Keeping Drivers, WALL STREET J. (May 12, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-and-lyft-face-tough-test-of-finding-and-keeping-drivers-11557673863. 
20 Le Chen et al., Peeking Beneath the Hood of Uber, INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONF., 1, 2 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/09/00011-97592.pdf (short-term surge 
prices cannot be forecast). 
21 Surge pricing incentivizes drivers to enter areas of high demand, such as near event venues.  This can “help[s] 
ensure that riders can get a ride when they need one.”  Travis Andersen & Adam Vaccaro, Uber Used Surge Pricing 





Part II will provide a background of Uber and Lyft, which occupy most of today’s rideshare 
market.  It will also explain why the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that 
rideshare drivers are independent contractors, not employees.  Part III will discuss why rideshare 
drivers lack legal protections under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and antitrust law 
because drivers are independent contractors under federal law.  Part IV will discuss why artificial 
surge pricing constitutes unlawful price-fixing under antitrust law.  Finally, Part V will discuss 
why increasing driver pay will discourage artificial surge pricing.  It will also propose a solution 
that aims to strike a balance between honoring drivers’ desire for higher pay and job flexibility 
and rideshare companies’ goal of managing labor costs and making consumers happy.  Part VI 
will conclude the Comment.  
II. Background 
The emergence of rideshare in 2010 transformed the transportation industry22 and labor 
market.23  Rideshare has revolutionized the way people commute and arrange carpools.24  Uber, 
the first rideshare company, debuted as the UberCab app in 2010.25  Uber’s algorithms quickly and 
efficiently match drivers with passengers.26  “The original Uber concept—a private ride, 
summoned by tapping an app on your smartphone—was so simple and universally appealing that 
it upended the traditional cab industry practically overnight.”27  In 2012, the second rideshare 
 
22 See generally Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption?  Estimating the Uber Effect, U. OF OXFORD (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/Uber_Drivers_of_Disruption.pdf. 
23 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J., 577, 580 (2016). 
24 Shifting the Transportation Paradigm, RIDE AMIGOS, https://rideamigos.com/ridesharing-shifting-the-
transportation-paradigm/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
25 Nathan McAlone, This Is How Uber Used to Look When It First Started Out — And How It's Changed Over Time, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-design-history-2010-2016-2016-2/. 
26 Rory Cellan-Jones, Uber And Indiegogo - Tales of Disruption, BBC (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27999589. 
27 Alison Griswold, Uber’s Stunning Journey to a $90 Billion IPO Changed Transportation Forever, QUARTZ (Apr. 
27, 2019), https://qz.com/1592032/how-uber-got-to-its-90-billion-ipo-and-changed-transportation-forever/. 
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company, Lyft, launched in San Francisco.28  Known for its cars wearing pink moustaches, Lyft 
began as a “community ride-sharing model.”29  Lyft and Uber work essentially the same: riders 
request a private ride through a smartphone app.30 
Together, Uber and Lyft dominate the US rideshare market.31  In the second quarter of 
2019, Uber garnered 71% of rideshare spending, while Lyft earned 27%.32  Through July 2019, 
Uber and Lyft have made $50 billion in revenue in the US.33  Over 66 million people,34 or more 
than one in three people in the US, have used rideshare apps.35  3.9 million people drive for Uber 
worldwide.36  Approximately 1.5 million people drive for Lyft in the US.37  Many people drive for 
both companies.38  
Central to rideshare companies’ success is working with drivers as independent contractors 
rather than employees.39  As independent contractors, rideshare drivers have the flexibility to 
choose their own schedules; they, however, forego many benefits more often available through 
 
28 Andrew Greiner et al., A History of Lyft, From Fuzzy Pink Mustaches to Global Ride Share Giant, CNN (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/03/business/lyft-history/index.html. 
29 Christina Farr, Lyft Team Gets $60M More; Now It Must Prove Ride-Sharing Can Go Global, VENTUREBEAT (May 
23, 2013), https://venturebeat.com/2013/05/23/lyft-races-ahead-with-60m-in-funding-but-what-challenges-lie-
ahead/. 
30 Levi Davis, Lyft vs. Uber: What's the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/010715/key-differences-between-uber-and-lyft.asp. 
31 Kathryn Gessner, Uber vs. Lyft: Who’s Tops in the Battle of U.S. Rideshare Companies, SECOND MEASURE (Aug. 
21, 2019), https://secondmeasure.com/datapoints/rideshare-industry-overview/. 
32 Id.  
33 Ride Hailing: United States, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/outlook/368/109/ride-hailing/united-states (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
34 Id.  
35 E. Mazareanu, Ridesharing Services in the U.S.- Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Jul 9, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/topics/4610/ridesharing-services-in-the-us/. 
36 Uber has not disclosed the number of drivers in the US.  Company Info, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).    See also Melissa Berry, How Many 
Uber Drivers Are There?, THE RIDESHARE GUY (June 1, 2019), https://therideshareguy.com/how-many-uber-drivers-
are-there/ (estimating 1.5–2.5 million Uber drivers in the US). 
37 Drivers Impact, LYFT, https://www.lyftimpact.com/impact/drivers (last visited Sept. 13, 2019). 
38 Clarke Bowman, I'm a Driver for Uber and Lyft — Here Are 10 Things I Wish I Knew Before Starting the Job, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-drivers-job-advice-car-2019-8. 
39 Alexis Keenan, Uber And Lyft Face 2 Big Threats to Their Business Model After New California Law, YAHOO FIN. 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/uber-lyft-lawsuit-contractors-employees-law-174002068.html. 
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traditional employment.40  As independent contractors, rideshare drivers do not have the right 
under the NLRA to organize collectively to improve their working conditions.41  They do not 
receive benefits, such as health insurance, retirement plants, paid time off, or vacation days.42  
Rideshare drivers fall outside scope of statutes prohibiting discriminatory conduct on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, and age or the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993.43  Moreover, rideshare drivers are not entitled to unemployment compensation under 
the Social Security Act of 1935, or minimum wage, maximum workweek hours, and overtime 
guarantees under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.44  
Recent news hints that trouble may be on the way for Uber and Lyft, possibly due in part 
to driver dissatisfaction.45  In the second quarter of 2019, Uber posted more than $5 billion in 
losses,46 and Lyft posted $644.2 million in losses.47  Rideshare competition has contributed to 
Uber’s slower growth rate.48  Uber highlighted its labor issues as a risk to its competitiveness: “If 
we are unable to attract or maintain a critical mass of Drivers, consumers … whether as a result of 
 
40 How to Become an Uber Driver: Step-by-Step Guide, GIGWORKER (June 25, 2019), https://gigworker.com/how-to-
become-uber-driver/. 
41 William B. Gould IV, Dynamex Is Dynamite, but Epic Systems Is Its Foil - Chamber of Commerce: The Sleeper in 
the Trilogy, 83 MO. L. REV. 989, 993 (2018). 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 995. 
44 Id. at 993.  The US Department of Labor, the agency responsible for enforcing the FLSA, has recently ruled that 
gig economy workers (service providers working for a virtual marketplace company) are not employees within the 
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Letter from Keith E. Sonderling, Acting Administrator, U.S. Dept. of Labor 
Wage and Hour Division to [Redacted Party] (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2019/2019_04_29_06_FLSA.pdf. 
45 David Trainer et al., Opinion: Uber’s Own Numbers Show Why Investors Shouldn’t Believe in Its Vision, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ubers-own-numbers-show-why-investors-
shouldnt-believe-in-its-vision-2019-08-19. 
46 Uber Reports Second Quarter 2019 Results, UBER INV. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://investor.uber.com/news-
events/news/press-release-details/2019/Uber-Reports-Second-Quarter-2019-Results/default.aspx. 
47 Kate Conger, Lyft’s Losses Continue, But Company Says They Will Abate, NY TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/technology/lyft-earnings-revenue.html?module=inline 




competition or other factors, our platform will become less appealing to platform users.”49   
Rideshare companies must proactively resolve their labor issues.  Otherwise, their “ramp-up time, 
driver quality, and customer loyalty” will likely suffer.50 
A. Rideshare Drivers Are Independent Contractors Under the NLRA and SuperShuttle51 
Applying the common law agency test adopted in SuperShuttle,52 the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) concluded that Uber drivers are independent contractors within the 
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).53  The NLRA endorses a national policy 
of encouraging workers to collectively bargain for better working conditions.54  The NLRA grants 
employees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection . . . [and] the right to refrain from any or all of such activities  . . 
. .”55  The NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,56 excludes independent contractors from 
the definition of “employee.”57  The NLRB, the administrative agency charged with administering 
 
49 Uber Technologies, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), 1, 13, (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.htm [hereinafter Uber SEC 
Registration Statement]. 
50 Russell Hensley, Cracks in the Ridesharing Market—And How to Fill Them, MCKINSEY Q. (July 2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/cracks-in-the-ridesharing-market-and-
how-to-fill-them. 
51 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., Local 1338, 367 NLRB No. 75, 1, 1 (Jan. 25, 2019), 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582a96a9c.  
52 See generally, id. 
53 Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Associate General Counsel, NLRB Office of the General Counsel, to 
Jill Coffman, Regional Director, NLRB Region 10, 1, 1 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-163062 
[hereinafter Advice Memorandum from Sophir].  See also NLRB v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 US 132, 142 (1975) 
(“[T]he General Counsel will decide the issue submitted, and his ‘final determination’ will be communicated to the 
Regional Director by way of an Advice Memorandum.  The memorandum will briefly summarize the facts, against 
the background of which the legal or policy issue is to be decided, set forth the General Counsel's answer to the legal 
or policy issue submitted together with a ‘detailed legal rationale,’ and contain ‘instructions for the final processing 
of the case.”). 
54 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
55 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
56 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 1.  
57 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
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the NLRA,58 enforces violations of employees’ rights to organize and bargain.59  Congress invested 
in the NLRB the primary power of interpretation and application of the NLRA.60  The NLRB 
determines in the first instance whether particular conduct is protected or prohibited under the 
NLRA.61   
The NLRB applies the common law agency test to determine whether a worker is an 
employee or an independent contractor.62  This test requires application of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 220 (1958) common-law factors.63  The Supreme Court declared that courts 
must consider all of the factors and that no single factor is dispositive.64  The NLRB and lower 
courts have also considered that a worker’s entrepreneurial opportunity weighs in favor of finding 
independent contractor status.65  Finally, in the for-hire vehicle industry, the NLRB has considered 
two additional factors: whether the company receives compensation based on the amount of fares 
drivers collect and whether the company controls the manner and means of the drivers’ work.66 
In determining that Uber drivers are independent contractors, the NLRB followed 
SuperShuttle, a case involving shared-ride van franchisees.67  SuperShuttle arose from a union’s 
 
58 29 U.S.C. § 153. 
59 29 U.S.C. § 160.  See also Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 632 (2019). 
60 Intl. Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 240 (1971), holding that states and federal courts ““must 
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.” 
61 Id.  
62 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 1, citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). 
63 Id. at 1–2.  All of the common law factors are: “(a) The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work.  (b) Whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business.  (c) The kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision.  (d) The skill required in the particular occupation.   
(e) Whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work.  (f) The length of time for which the person is employed.  (g) The method of payment, whether by the 
time or by the job.  (h) Whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer.  (i) Whether or not the 
parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant.  (j) Whether the principal is or is not in business.”  
Id. 
64 United Ins., 390 U.S. at 258.  
65 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 2.  
66 Id. at 1–2.  
67 Id. at 1.  
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attempt to represent SuperShuttle Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) franchisees.68  SuperShuttle drivers 
sign a franchise agreement that expressly characterizes them as independent business operators.69   
Drivers provide their own vehicles.70  They pay for fuel, maintenance, tolls, and access fees.71  
They choose their schedules and assignments.72  Drivers alone retain the fares paid by customers.73  
Although drivers exercise autonomy, SuperShuttle exerts significant influence over their 
work environments.74  Drivers may not negotiate the terms of the franchise agreement.75  They 
must wear uniforms.76  Their vehicles must comply with SuperShuttle’s requirements.77  
SuperShuttle sets fares.78  Drivers must also pay SuperShuttle an initial franchise fee and weekly 
fees for the right to use the SuperShuttle brand and ride reservation system.79  Further, SuperShuttle 
screens drivers’ criminal backgrounds, driving records, and drug and alcohol use.80 
Despite evidence of SuperShuttle’s control over the drivers, the NLRB concluded that 
drivers are independent contractors by highlighting several key facts.81  First, the extent of 
SuperShuttle’s daily control over drivers is low because drivers have complete discretion over 
when and where they work.82  Second, SuperShuttle’s method of payment allows drivers to keep 
all the fares they earn.83  Third, drivers exercise control over their instrumentalities or tools of 
work by owning or leasing their vehicles and paying for licenses to use SuperShuttle’s dispatch 
 
68 Id. at 3. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 3.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 5.  
74 Id. at 3–6.  
75 Id. at 4. 
76 Id. at 13. 
77 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 13.  
78 Id. at 13.  
79 Id. at 3.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 7.  
82 Id. at 12.  
83 SuperShuttle, 367 NLRB No. 75 at 13.  
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system.84  Fourth, drivers work without supervision.85  Finally, the franchise agreement between 
SuperShuttle and its drivers clearly shows that the parties intended to create an independent-
contractor relationship.86  Therefore, considering all the common law factor and the factors unique 
to the taxicab industry, the NLRB ruled that the SuperShuttle shared-ride van franchisees are 
independent contractors, not employees within the meaning of the NLRA.87 
In Uber Technologies, the NLRB applied the SuperShuttle common law agency test and 
taxicab factors to conclude that Uber drivers are independent contractors.88  In this case, the facts 
are substantially similar to those in SuperShuttle.  Uber Technologies arose from two charges 
alleging that Uber unlawfully terminated drivers and interfered with a labor organization of 
drivers.89  Uber drivers directly contract with Uber or became independent contractors of 
businesses that contracted with Uber.90  Uber drivers do not pay to use the app.91  Uber requires 
drivers to adhere to vehicle standards and wait for riders.92  Uber sets fares.93  Riders pay Uber, 
which retains a portion of the fares, then later pays the remainder to drivers.94  Riders rate their 
rides “on a scale of 1 (worst) to 5 (best).”95  Uber terminates drivers with average low ratings.96  
Like the drivers in SuperShuttle, the Uber drivers exercise significant autonomy over their 
work, which supports the NLRB’s finding that they are independent contractors.97  Uber’s 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 14–15.  
86 Id. at 14.  
87 Id.  
88 Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 1. 
89 Id. at 1–2. 
90 Id. at 2.  
91 Id. at 6.  
92 Id. at 8.  
93 Id. at 7. 
94 Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 2.  
95 Id. at 3. 
96 Id.  




exercises low control over drivers because drivers could accept or reject ride requests, set their 
own schedules and geographic locations, and work for competitors.98  While Uber provides the 
dispatch system through its app, commercial liability insurance, and assistance for minor rider-
caused damage, drivers provide their own vehicles, fuel, and maintenance.99  Drivers work without 
supervision.100  Agreements between Uber and drivers “explicitly characterize[d]” their 
relationship as independent contractors.101  Although drivers shared fares with Uber, suggesting 
an employee relationship,102 the NLRB reasoned that the absence of a flat fee like that in 
SuperShuttle actually increased entrepreneurial opportunity; therefore, Uber’s fare-sharing 
arrangement with drivers was a neutral factor in the NLRB’s analysis.103  Ultimately, NLRB 
determined that Uber drivers had more entrepreneurial opportunity than SuperShuttle drivers104 
and concluded that Uber drivers are independent contractors.105  
B. Why Rideshare Drivers Engage in Artificial Surge Pricing 
Nearly half of Uber and Lyft drivers are dissatisfied with the companies.106  To work as 
independent contractors, drivers must pay for insurance, vehicles, tolls and other fees, licenses, 
gas, and maintenance.107  Drivers must also pay income taxes and self-employment taxes.108  
 
98 Id. at 6.  
99 Id. at 11–12. 
100 Advice Memorandum from Sophir, supra note 53, at 12.  Rather than control drivers through supervision, Uber 
relied on its customer-driven rating system to indirectly regulate driver behavior.  Id. at 11.  
101 Id. at 12. 
102 Id. at 10 (“[I]n flat-fee arrangements, the company lacks motivation to control the manner and means of drivers’ 
work, giving drivers significant entrepreneurial opportunity because they retain all fares; whereas in commission-
based compensation, in which the company’s earnings depend upon driver production, the company has a greater 
incentive to control drivers’ activities, thus giving them less entrepreneurial opportunity [suggesting an employment 
relationship].”) . 
103 Id. at 11.  
104 Id. at 9.  
105 Id. at 15.  
106 Harry Campbell, Lyft & Uber Driver Survey 2019: Uber Driver Satisfaction Takes a Big Hit, THE RIDESHARE GUY 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://therideshareguy.com/uber-driver-survey/. 
107 How Much Does an Uber Driver Make in 2019?  [The Inside Scoop], RIDESTER (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.ridester.com/how-much-do-uber-drivers-make/. 




Drivers do not get health insurance or sick leave.109  Although fare rates have been increasing, 
drivers are not taking home additional pay.110  After expenses, drivers claim they earn $5 or $6 an 
hour.111  Moreover, although drivers may earn more by working when surge price is in effect, they 
now make less than before.112  Because of Uber’s changes to its surge pricing policy, drivers earn 
fixed amounts instead of a percentage of the fare.113  Because of low take-home pay, fewer 
qualified people sign up to drive for Uber.114  Every quarter, Uber sees about a 30% rate of 
attrition.115  Every two years, nearly all of the pool of working rideshare drivers turn over.116   
Drivers went on strike in seven cities across the country to call for better pay and benefits.117  A 
California driver participating in the strike earned $1,500 working less than forty hours a week 
when she first started driving for Uber.118  Then Uber slashed surge rates and bonuses.119  Because 
of the changes to driver pay, she now works about eight to nine hours every day of the week.120  
She makes $150 a day.121  
 
109 Kate Conger et al., Uber Drivers’ Day of Strikes Circles the Globe Before the Company’s I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES (May 
8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/technology/uber-strike.html. 
110 Greg Epstein, Hundreds of Uber and Lyft Drivers to Launch a Protest Caravan Across California, TECHCRUNCH 
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/22/hundreds-of-uber-and-lyft-drivers-to-launch-a-protest-caravan-
across-california/. 
111 Id. 




114 Johana Bhuiyan, Drivers Don’t Trust Uber. This Is How It’s Trying to Win Them Back, RECODE (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/5/16777536/uber-travis-kalanick-recruit-drivers-tipping.  See also Johana Bhuiyan, If 
Lyft Can’t Keep Its Drivers as Independent Contractors, It May Never Be Profitable, LA TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-ipo-drivers-20190309-story.html. 
115 Id. 
116 Hensley, supra note 50. 
117 Chris Morris, Uber Drivers Plan 12-Hour Strike As Company Looks Toward IPO, FORTUNE (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://fortune.com/2019/04/24/uber-drivers-plan-12-hour-strike/. 
118 Epstein, supra note 110. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  This rate comes out to $1,050 a week.  
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To increase their pay, rideshare drivers have collectively engaged in artificial surge pricing 
in cities across the United States.122  Some drivers who do not want to engage in the practice say 
they nonetheless feel compelled to participate after three years of pay cuts.123  Ordinarily, surge 
pricing raises the regular price of rideshare fares when demand exceeds supply.124  Uber uses an 
algorithm that determines the price of fares based on the levels of demand and supply in a particular 
area.125  The algorithm updates every five to ten minutes.126  Lyft uses a similar price-adjusting 
system called “Personal Power Zones.”127  Surge pricing incentivizes drivers to enter busy areas, 
restoring balance between supply and demand.128  Uber’s former Chief Executive Travis Kalanick 
explained that “during the busiest times . . . [surge pricing] maximizes the number of trips and 
minimizes the number of people stranded.”129  Common conditions triggering surge pricing 
include inclement weather and special events.130  For example, after an Ariana Grande concert at 
Madison Square Garden in New York City in 2015, the uptick in demand for Uber rides triggered 
surge pricing.131   Fares were multiplied by up to 1.8 times the non-surge fare.132  
In contrast, artificial surge pricing occurs when drivers simultaneously turn off the app to 
create an apparent precipitous drop in demand, then turn it back on at the same time after surge 
 
122 Sam Sweeney, Uber Drivers Across the U.S. Are Manipulating Fares to Create Artificial Price Surges, ABC7 
(June 13, 2019), https://wjla.com/features/7-on-your-side/uber-drivers-nationwide-manipulating-fares-artificial-
surges. 
123 Id. 
124 How Surge Pricing Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/partner-app/how-surge-works/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2019). 
125 Omar Faroque, How UBER Surge Price Works, MEDIUM (Sept. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/system-
design/how-uber-surge-price-works-edd898ca3746. 
126 Id.  
127 Personal Power Zones, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012926807-Personal-Power-Zones (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2019).  
128 How Surge Pricing Works, supra note 124. 
129 Annie Lowrey, Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of High-Tech Gouging?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-example-of-high-tech-
gouging.html?_r=0. 
130 How Surge Pricing Works, supra note 124.  See also Id. 
131 Jonathan Hall et al., The Effects of Uber’s Surge Pricing: A Case Study, UBER, https://eng.uber.com/research/the-
effects-of-ubers-surge-pricing-a-case-study/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019). 
132 Id.  
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pricing is triggered, thus raising fares.133  The practice has been reported at Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport,134 Tampa Bay in Florida,135 and New York City.136  A driver in 
Tampa claimed that drivers have been engaging in artificial surge pricing “for a long, long time.”137 
Surge pricing’s volatility makes the algorithm unpopular among riders, a problem 
exacerbated when the increase is manipulated by drivers and unconnected to any obvious external 
trigger.138  To riders, surge pricing feels like price gouging.139  For “[t]he same service[,] [t]he 
same amount of time[,] [t]he same trip, if in reverse,” surge pricing has irritated many riders 
because it raises the price of rides precisely when rides are needed the most.140  Further, surge 
pricing’s opaque algorithm generates frustration.141  No one, except the rideshare companies 
themselves, know exactly how surge pricing works.142  In fact, surge pricing was so detested in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, that the city passed an ordinance to ban it.143  Supporters of the ordinance 
 
133 Sweeney, supra note 122. 
134 Id.  
135 Caitlin Johnston, Uber's Low Fares Spark Backlash: Drivers Protest Pay Cuts, Customers May Face Surge Pricing, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.tampabay.com/news/transportation/ubers-low-fares-spark-backlash-
drivers-protest-pay-cuts-customers-may-face/2261405/. 
136 Bruce Schneier, Uber Drivers Hacking the System to Cause Surge Pricing, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Aug. 8, 2017, 
9:35 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/08/uber_drivers_ha.html. 
137 Sweeney, supra note 122. 
138 Utpal M. Dholakia, Why Do Consumers Hate Uber’s Surge Pricing?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-science-behind-behavior/201512/why-do-consumers-hate-uber-s-
surge-pricing. 
139 Id. See also Marcus Wohlsen, Uber Boss Says Surging Prices Rescue People From the Snow, WIRED (Dec. 17, 
2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/12/uber-surge-pricing/. 
140 Lowrey, supra note 129. 
141 Id.  
142 Dholakia, supra note 138. 
143 Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Uber Decries Ride-Hailing Price Cap Passed in Honolulu, AP (June 7, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/3203ea475ebf4c268027fe89c74b4f15/Uber-decries-ride-hailing-price-cap-passed-in-Honolulu.   
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complained that surge pricing preys on riders, such as service members returning from sea or 
intoxicated people.144 
C. Current Developments 
Recently, drivers have engaged in high-profile efforts in courts and state legislatures to 
amend laws around independent contractors.145  In Dynamex/AB-5 in California, drivers have 
aimed to simply reclassify rideshare drivers as employees. 146  Following California’s adoption of 
AB-5, New Jersey147 and New York148 are considering similar measures.149  In Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, drivers sought to gain more power to change the 
terms of their agreements with rideshare companies.150  In response, rideshare companies have 
 
144 Council approves limits on 'surge pricing' for ride-hailing companies, HAWAII NEWS NOW (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/38367767/council-approves-limits-on-price-surging-for-ride-hailing-
companies/. 
145 In New York City, drivers have also aimed to directly increase their wages through local laws.  See N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMIN. CODE § 19-548 (2018); https://nycadmincode.readthedocs.io/t19/c05/index.html.  See also Notice of 
Promulgation, N.Y.C. TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/driver_income_rules_12_04_2018.pdf.  
146 Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P3d 1, 35–36 (Cal. 2018).  “Under [the ABC] test, a worker is properly 
considered an independent contractor to whom a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes: (A) 
that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both 
under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the 
usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity.”  See also 
Noam Scheiber, Gig Economy Business Model Dealt a Blow in California Ruling, NY TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018); Susan 
K. Lessack, California Adopts Stricter Test for Independent Contractor Status, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/california-adopts-stricter-test-for-independent-contractor-status-2018-05-
09/. 
147 New Jersey’s version of California’s AB-5 would go beyond that of California by deeming all workers 
employees for purposes of all state employment laws.  S. 4204, 218th Legislature (N.J. 2019), 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S4500/4204_I1.HTM (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).  S. 4204 has not been 
enacted.  David M. Walsh, New Jersey Independent Contractor Bill Based on “ABC” Test Has Failed – For Now, 
NAT. L. R. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-independent-contractor-bill-based-
abc-test-has-failed-now; Brent Johnson, Contentious N.J. Independent Contractors Bill Won’t Get Vote Before 
Session Ends Next Week, NJ ADVANCE (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/contentious-nj-
independent-contractors-bill-wont-get-vote-before-session-ends-next-week.html. 
148 Keshia Clukey, N.Y. Governor to Address Gig Worker Status, Legalize Pot, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/n-y-governor-to-address-gig-worker-status-legalize-pot. 
149 These state law changes do not change the definition of independent contractors under federal law.  See, e.g., 
Stephen L. Carter, California Truck Ruling Exposes Weakness of Gig Economy Law AB5, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-09/ab5-california-law-threatens-gig-workers. 
150 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F3d 769 (9th Cir 2018). 
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forcefully objected to these efforts.151  Uber and Lyft claim that changes to worker classification 
will negatively affect their business.152 
In Dynamex, the California Supreme Court clarified that the “ABC test” is the appropriate 
standard in finding whether workers are employees or independent contractors under state wage 
law.153  The plaintiffs worked as Dynamex drivers providing “on-demand, same-day pickup and 
delivery services.”154  Prior to 2004, Dynamex classified the drivers as employees.155  Thereafter, 
Dynamex reclassified the drivers as independent contractors to reduce expenses.156  The drivers 
sued Dynamex asserting that, because they performed essentially the same work as when they 
were classified as employees, Dynamex misclassified the drivers as independent contractors.157  
Although the California Supreme Court did not directly address the question of whether the drivers 
were employees or independent contractors, the court concluded that the appropriate standard was 
the “ABC test.”158  The ABC test creates a presumption that workers are employees rather than 
independent contractors unless the hiring entity satisfies a three-part test.159  An entity must 
 
151 Shirin Ghaffary, Uber and Lyft Say They Don’t Plan to Reclassify Their Drivers as Employees, VOX (Sept. 11, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/11/20861599/ab-5-uber-lyft-drivers-contractors-reclassify-employees.  
152 Uber SEC Registration Statement, supra note 49, at 28 (“If, as a result of legislation or judicial decisions, we are 
required to classify Drivers as employees . . . we would incur significant additional expenses for compensating Drivers, 
potentially including expenses associated with the application of wage and hour laws (including minimum wage, 
overtime, and meal and rest period requirements), employee benefits, social security contributions, taxes, and 
penalties.  Further, any such reclassification would require us to fundamentally change our business model, and 
consequently have an adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”); Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement 
(Form S-1) (Mar. 1, 2019), 1, 28, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm (“A determination in, or 
settlement of, any legal proceeding, whether we are party to such legal proceeding or not, that classifies a driver of a 
ridesharing platform as an employee, could harm our business, financial condition and results of operations.”). 
153 Dynamex, 416 P3d at 5, 7.  
154 Id. at 8.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 9.  
158 Id. at 42. 
159 Dynamex, 416 P3d at 7.  
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establish that a worker (1) is free from its control, (2) performs work outside the usual course of 
its business, and (3) is engaged in an independent trade or business.160 
The decision, however, has been superseded by a new statute.  Signed into law in 
September 2019, California’s AB-5161 purports to codify the California Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dynamex.  AB5 “creates a presumption that a worker who performs services for a hirer is an 
employee for purposes of claims for wages and benefits arising under wage orders,” unless the 
worker is shown to be an independent contractor under the ABC test.162  In response to AB5’s 
enactment, Uber and Lyft are pursuing several strategies.  First, Uber claims that it is still able to 
pass the ABC test because the work of driving is outside the scope of Uber’s business which is 
serving as a technology platform, not as a transportation company.163  Second, Uber and Lyft refuse 
to classify its drivers as employees.164  Third, Uber has changed its app to relinquish more control 
to drivers.165  Finally, Uber and Lyft are promoting a 2020 ballot initiative to expressly exempt 
themselves from AB5.166 
 
160 Id.  
161 AB-5 Worker status: employees and independent contractors (2019-2020), CALIF. LEGIS. INFO. 
https://legiscan.com/CA/text/AB5/2019 (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).  
162 AB-5, 2019–2020 Leg., Sess. (Cal. 2019), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5 
163 Tony West, Update on AB5, UBER (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/ab5-update/.  See also 
Ghaffary, supra note 151 (“A spokesperson for Lyft similarly told Recode that the company has no immediate plans 
to reclassify its drivers.”). 
164 Scott Rodd, Uber, Lyft, Postmates Refuse to Comply with California Gig Economy Law, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793142903/as-california-tries-to-make-contract-workers-employees-industries-
push-back. 
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(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/06/ubers-secret-project-bolster-its-case-
against-ab-californias-gig-worker-law/.  These changes to the Uber app allow drivers to view estimated fares before 
accepting rides and to reject trips without penalties 
166 Sebastian Herrera, Uber, Lyft Unveil Ballot Initiative to Counter California Gig-Economy Law, WALL STREET J. 




Unlike Dynamex/AB5, which established the standard for classifying workers, Chamber 
of Commerce addressed the question of whether a local law, Ordinance 124968,167 violated federal 
antitrust law.168  Through the ordinance’s prescribed collective bargaining process, drivers and 
rideshare companies could negotiate equipment standards, behaviors, background checks, 
payments, hours, and other work conditions.169  The plaintiff, the Chamber of Commerce, argued 
that “the Ordinance violates, and is preempted by [the Sherman Antitrust Act] because the 
Ordinance sanctions price-fixing of ride-referral service fees by private cartels of independent-
contractor drivers.”170  The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss because it concluded 
the City was immune from preemption.171  The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded, 
holding that the Ordinance did not meet the requirements for state-action immunity.172  To date, 
neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit has addressed the underlying question of whether 
the ordinance violates federal antitrust law.173 
III. Rideshare Drivers’ Collective Actions Are Not Protected Under Antitrust Law174  
 
167 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~legislativeItems/Ordinances/Ord_124968.pdf.  See also SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 6.310.110; 
§ 6.310.735. 
168 Edward Gaus, “Gig Economy” Scores a Victory in Ninth Circuit Antitrust Case, A.B.A. (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/practice/2018/us-chamber-of-commerce-v-
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169 SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 6.310.735(H). 
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171 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp 3d 1155, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
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Uber misclassifies its drivers as independent contractors, and that this misclassification violates antitrust law.   
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Antitrust law does not shield rideshare drivers from liability for artificial surge pricing 
because drivers are independent contractors175 engaging in a practice in restraint of trade within 
the meaning of the Sherman Act,176 Clayton Act,177 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Act.178  Federal antitrust laws prohibit “cartels, price fixing, and other combinations or practices 
that undermine the free market.”179  Collective activities by workers to improve their pay may 
violate antitrust laws unless they fall within an exemption.180  The Clayton Act181 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act182 provide labor exemptions from antitrust law.  These laws, however, exclude 
collective action by independent contractors under the labor exemptions.183  The FTC Act 
supplements and bolsters the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.184  Congress empowered the FTC 
with “regulatory and quasi-judicial authority”185 “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations 
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”186   
The principal federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act aims to promote market competition 
by barring unreasonable restraints of trade or commerce.187  The Sherman Act provides that 
 
175 Courts will likely defer to the NLRB’s determination that Uber drivers are independent contractors.  See discussion 
infra Section II(A)(1).  Separately, surge pricing arguably falls out of the scope of antitrust law because transportation 
services are not commodities within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.  See Keyawna Griffith, Note, The Uber 
Loophole That Protects Surge Pricing, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 34, 36–38 (2019).  But this comment focuses on 
antitrust implications because drivers are independent contractors engaging in the restraint of trade under the Sherman 
Act and the FTC Act.  
176 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38. 
177 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27. 
178 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. 
179 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 US 494, 502 (2015). 
180 Lao, supra note 18, at 1546. 
181 15 U.S.C. § 17. 
182 Columbia Riv. Packers Ass’n. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 143–44 (1942). 
183 Lao, supra note 18, at 1560–61.  
184 FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953).  See also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 
692 (1948). 
185 Craig Ganter, Note, Disclosing Under the Influencer: How the FTC Fails to Guide Advertisers and Protect 
Consumers in Social Media "Influencer" Marketing, RUTGERS U.L. REV. COMMENTS 47, 49 (2019), 
http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Ganter_Commentary_Spring_2019-1.pdf. 
186 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
187 Lao, supra note 18, 1558.  
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“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”188  
In the Sherman Act’s early years, courts held that union labor activities were unlawful restraints 
of trade when a union's conduct or objectives were deemed “socially or economically harmful.”189  
Disagreeing with the courts’ enforcement of the Sherman Act against labor activities, 
Congress enacted the Clayton Act.190  The Clayton Act declares that “[t]he labor of a human being 
is not a commodity or article of commerce.”191  The law expressly provides that activities by labor 
organizations “instituted for the purposes of mutual help” do not violate antitrust law.192  Labor 
organizations must be “bona fide,” which means combinations of employees, not independent 
contractors.193  
Enacted twenty years after the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act aimed to strengthen 
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act by providing that courts may not enjoin labor activities that 
are lawful under those statutes.194  In cases applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court 
has held that antitrust law does not permit collective activities in restraint of trade by independent 
entrepreneurs or independent contractors.195  The Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents any federal court 
from having  
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in 
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or 
 
188 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
189 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 485 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
190 Lao, supra note 18, at 1559.  
191 15 U.S.C. § 17. 
192 Id.  See also H. A. Artists & Assoc. v Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 713 (1981). 
193 H. A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 717 n. 20 (1981) (actors' agents were considered a labor group).  The Supreme Court also 
held that labor unions acting in their self-interest and not in combination with nonlabor groups enjoy a statutory 
exemption from Sherman Act liability.  United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). 
194 See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 235–237.  Despite the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, courts routinely held that 
labor activities were unlawful under antitrust law.  Daniel Belke, Note, Blitzing Brady: Should Section 4(A) of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act Shield Management from Injunctions in Labor Disputes?, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 60–61 
(2013). 
195 Columbia Riv. Packers Ass’n. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1942); L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 94, 102–103 (1962). 
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persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly 
or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work 
or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becoming or remaining a member 
of any labor organization or of any employer organization . . . (f) Assembling 
peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor 
dispute . . . .196 
 
In Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, the Supreme Court posited that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act focused on labor disputes between employers and employees.197  Because the respondents 
were independent entrepreneurs, not employees, the federal courts had jurisdiction to issue an 
injunction against their collective efforts to monopolize the regional fish industry.198  In Los 
Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, the Supreme Court similarly 
concluded that the federal courts had jurisdiction to dissolve an “illegal combination between 
businessmen and a union to restrain commerce.”199  Although the independent entrepreneurs joined 
what they described as a “union,” they were not immune from antitrust law because their case did 
not arise from labor dispute.200 
Because the antitrust labor exemption does not extend to independent contractors, the FTC 
has brought enforcement actions against independent contractors for collectively organizing to 
increase their wages.201  For example, in FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court held that independent lawyers’ collective activities constituted “a ‘naked restraint’ on price 
and output.”202  The lawyers in that case agreed to boycott the District of Columbia government to 
increase their public defense fees.203  Although the court did not discuss the antitrust labor 
exemption, the lawyers’ collective activities would have been immune if the lawyers were 
 
196 29 U.S.C. § 104.  
197 Hinton, 315 U.S. at 145.  
198 Id. at 143, 147.  
199 L.A. Meat, 371 U.S. at 102.  
200 Id. at 101–102.  
201 Lao, supra note 18, at 1558–9, 1562–1563.  See also Id. at 1562 n. 88. 
202 FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n., 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990). 
203 Id. at 418. 
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employees rather than independent entrepreneurs.204  As another example, in United States v. 
Fed’n. of Physicians & Dentists, Inc., the U.S. Government alleged that independent physicians 
impermissibly acted together to prevent a fee decrease. 205  The district court’s final judgment 
expressly distinguished the physicians from unionized employees who may lawfully exercise their 
right to organize as protected by the NLRA.206  
IV. Artificial Surge Pricing Likely Violates Antitrust Law as Price-Fixing 
Collusion among competitors is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”207  Under the Sherman Act, 
an agreement between competitors to raise, depress, or fix the price of a commodity in interstate 
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.208  Such unlawful price-fixing is also prohibited under the 
FTC Act.209  Because rideshare drivers are independent contractors whose actions fall outside the 
scope of antitrust labor exemptions, they are likely engaging in unlawful price-fixing when they 
work together to trigger surge pricing.210  Since rideshare companies set surge prices, which drivers 
then manipulate, both rideshare companies and drivers will probably be vulnerable to litigation, 
including charges brought by the FTC. 
A. What Is Price-Fixing? 
Generally, most collective activities “aimed at affecting prices” constitute price-fixing, 
unless an exemption applies.211  Antitrust law recognizes two types of price-fixing: horizontal and 
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208 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
209 Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944). 
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vertical.212  Horizontal price-fixing agreements between independent competitors that dampen 
output or competition to raise prices are per se unlawful.213  These agreements are per se unlawful 
because they are likely to produce anticompetitive effects.214  To prove horizontal price-fixing, the 
plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement or conspiracy, (2) among actual competitors, (3) “with the 
purpose or effect of ‘raising, depressing, fixing,  pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity’ 
(4) in interstate or foreign commerce.”215  An explicit agreement or circumstantial evidence 
establishing conspiratorial conduct may satisfy the first element.216  But “conscious parallel 
business behavior, standing alone, is insufficient to prove conspiracy.”217  
In contrast, because vertical price-fixing agreements between manufacturers and 
distributors or retailers may have pro-competitive effects, they are subject to the “rule of 
reason.”218  In Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court endorsed the rule 
of reason as the standard for determining whether a vertical trade-restraining practice violates the 
Sherman Act.219  The rule compares harmful, anticompetitive restraints with consumer-benefiting, 
pro-competitive restraints.220  The “rule of reason” test is highly fact-specific.221  Courts must 
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consider factors such as “specific information about the relevant business,” “the restraint's history, 
nature, and effect,” and “[w]hether the businesses involved have market power.”222 
Vertical price-fixing inquiries focus on whether minimum-pricing agreements between 
manufacturers and retailers or distributors may benefit consumers.223  On one hand, vertical price-
fixing may generate competition “among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type 
of product.”224  Consumers benefit by gaining more options.225  On the other hand, vertical price-
fixing could incentivize collusion to fix and set higher prices to generate greater profits for 
retailers.226 
B. Rideshare Pricing as Illegal Price-Fixing  
Although courts have not yet directly addressed the question of whether surge pricing, 
artificial or not, constitutes illegal price fixing, legal challenges to the practice may succeed if 
certain facts suggested in media reports on surge pricing are found to be true.227  To prevail on a 
claim of horizontal price-fixing, the FTC or other plaintiffs must prove, at minimum, that drivers 
as competitors agreed among themselves to raise fares.228  Presumably, that alone establishes 
liability. In contrast, to prevail on a claim of vertical price-fixing, the FTC or other plaintiffs carry 
the initial burden of showing that the agreement between rideshare companies and drivers has 
anticompetitive effects on the market, such as reducing output and increasing price.229  If the 
plaintiffs succeed, however, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the agreement has 
procompetitive effects.230  If the defendant meets this burden, then burden shifts back to the 
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plaintiff to show that the procompetitive effects “could be reasonably achieved through less 
anticompetitive means.”231 
In terms of a horizontal price-fixing claim, the FTC or other plaintiffs are likely to succeed.  
In Tampa, Florida, more than fifty drivers gathered to protest Uber’s reduced pay.232  During the 
rally, passengers were unable to request rides, which could have then triggered surge pricing.233  
Like the SCTLA lawyers who boycotted the District of Columbia to increase their pay,234 the 
drivers also refused to work to demand better wages.  Similarly, at Reagan National Airport in 
Washington, D.C., fifty drivers for Uber and Lyft parked in the waiting area and turned off their 
apps, while two drivers monitored surge prices on the apps.235  Once the prices reached a certain 
level, all drivers were told to turn their apps back on to take advantage of the surge pricing.  
Additionally, drivers may also be using online forums to collectively plan surge-pricing.236  
Evidence of drivers organizing a rally, cooperating at airport waiting areas, or communicating via 
the Internet to plan surge events may overcome the counterargument that the drivers merely 
engaged in parallel behavior.  Therefore, if drivers are found to have agreed to shut off their apps 
at the same time to raise prices, then a court may conclude that the drivers engaged in horizontal 
price-fixing.  
In contrast to a horizontal price-fixing claim, a vertical price-fixing claim will likely be 
more challenging.  Uber, as the app creator, fixes prices that drivers agree to charge riders.237  
Because vertical price-fixing requires a rule of reason analysis, the court will balance the pricing 
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system’s procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.  The court will first inquire whether surge 
pricing reduces output and whether it increases fare prices above the prices otherwise found in the 
market.238  On one hand, surge pricing may be anticompetitive because it increases prices, and 
Uber’s pricing system generally discourages drivers from competing with each other.239  Surge 
prices, however, may not be higher than consumers would expect to find in the market because 
regular rideshare prices are artificially low.240  On the other hand, surge pricing may be 
procompetitive because it increases customer choices.  When prices are high, other forms of 
transportation, such as taxis,241 public transportation,242 or other ridesharing apps,243 might be more 
attractive.  Uber and Lyft’s prices might actually encourage new apps to enter the market, creating 
more affordable consumer options.244  
Meyer v. Kalanick may be the first case on point to explore the theory that surge pricing 
constitutes price-fixing.245  In this case, Spencer Meyer, an Uber user on behalf of himself and 
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others similarly situated, alleged that Travis Kalanick, Uber’s the CEO and co-founder,246 violated 
the Sherman Act.247  Meyer claimed that Kalanick himself “orchestrated and facilitated an illegal 
price-fixing conspiracy” with Uber drivers.248  On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
the district court ruled that Meyer’s complaint plausibly alleged that Kalanick and Uber engaged 
in both horizontal and vertical price-fixing.249  In terms of horizontal price-fixing, Meyer might 
have a strong case.  Meyer alleged that drivers worked together to decrease output by “stay[ing] 
offline with UberX during non-surge times to trigger surges and thus obtain artificially increased 
fares.”250  The court found that these alleged facts can plausibly show that drivers conspired to 
decrease output and reduce competition to increase price.251  As a threshold matter, however, 
Meyer must prove conspiracy as an element of horizontal price-fixing.252  Kalanick reasonably 
pointed out that Meyer has not demonstrated any agreements among drivers.253  Kalanick 
contended that drivers independently agreed to use Uber’s pricing system, which does not 
sufficiently show conspiracy.254  As to whether drivers agreed to act together to raise fares, Meyer 
only stated that Uber organized “partner appreciation” events where drivers could meet.255  
Without more evidence, it is unclear whether Meyer can prove conspiracy by a large workforce 
with high turnover rates.  
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The district court denied the motion to dismiss because Meyer “adequately pled both a 
horizontal and a vertical conspiracy.”256  Subsequently, Kalanick and Uber moved to compel 
arbitration, which the district court denied.257  The Second Circuit reversed and granted Kalanick’s 
motion to compel arbitration.258  Thus, while courts have never fully considered whether Uber or 
Uber’s drivers’ collective actions constituted price fixing, we may soon get a resolution.  As of 
October 2019, an arbitrator will hear arguments concerning whether Uber’s surge pricing violates 
antitrust law in this case.259  Regardless of the outcome in this case, the FTC could still bring 
charges.  In the meantime, rideshare companies could also improve their ability to detect and stamp 
out artificial surge pricing, which could prospectively reduce legal risk.   
V. How to Decrease or Prevent Artificial Surge Pricing to Avoid Antitrust Liability 
To reduce litigation or regulatory risks associated with surge pricing,260 rideshare 
companies should voluntarily adopt policies aimed at preventing or disincentivizing artificial surge 
pricing.  Specifically, rideshare companies should increase driver compensation because drivers 
engage in artificial surge pricing to generate more income.261  Rideshare companies could increase 
pay, provide benefits, give drivers the option of working as an employee, or any combination of 
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these possibilities.  This approach will also likely generate other benefits, such as reducing 
turnover and ensuring quality service.262  
Increasing driver compensation will directly address drivers’ dissatisfaction with their 
earnings.  Rideshare companies could offer a minimum wage, such as the $21 per hour rate that 
Uber and Lyft have proposed;263 increase the percentage that drivers take from fares;264 and 
increase bonuses based on performance.265  Uber and Lyft have also proposed offering drivers 
stock, 266 which would not immediately provide cash.267 
A significant benefit of increasing compensation is permitting rideshare companies to 
continue partnering with drivers as independent contractors rather than employees.  For drivers, 
working as independent contractors is appealing precisely because of the flexibility.268  “[D]rivers 
change their work schedules from week to week, from day to day, and even from hour to hour.”269  
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Drivers can work around family and childcare obligations, rather than the reverse.270  Drivers can 
supplement their income through rideshare.271  For rideshare companies, preserving the 
independent contractor business model may help them avoid having to exert more control over the 
workforce, such as requiring certain work hours.272  
While increasing compensation would address one major area of driver dissatisfaction, this 
approach may still be unsatisfactory for drivers.  For example, increasing pay would not address 
the array of benefits that drivers want,273 such as healthcare274 and reimbursements for vehicle and 
maintenance expenses.275  Of course, rideshare companies could provide these benefits, which 
Uber and Lyft have offered.276  Uber and Lyft have also proposed “forming a new driver 
association, in partnership with state lawmakers and labor groups, to represent drivers’ interests 
and administer the sorts of benefits that meet their highly individual needs.”277  The costs of 
increasing pay and providing benefits, however, could be passed on to riders278 and further 
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endanger the companies’ profitability.279  Still, the rideshare industry may be able to absorb these 
costs.280 
Going a step farther than increasing pay and offering benefits, rideshare companies could 
also offer drivers a choice to work as an independent contractor or an employee.  Instacart, an 
online grocery shopping and delivery app,281 illustrates how this could work.282  In 2015, Instacart 
allowed its grocery shoppers to work as independent contractors or employees.283  Additionally, 
in 2019, Instacart began to offer a menu of benefits to all its workers, such as student loan 
assistance and personal injury insurance.284  Instacart’s independent contractors can work as much 
as they want, while employees may work up to twenty-nine hours a week.285  Instacart says that, 
although its employees are more expensive than independent contractors, “this change improved 
the quality and efficiency of order picking and made for a better customer experience.”286  The 
change also allowed Instacart to “perform management trainings and provide more quality 
control.”287  Despite these internal policy changes, however, Instacart workers are still seeking 
better pay.288 
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By classifying its workers as employees, rideshare companies could avoid antitrust liability 
resulting from artificial surge pricing.289  But rideshare companies are not receptive to this 
approach.  First, employing drivers would be very costly.290  In California alone, employing drivers 
would cost $508 million for Uber and $290 million for Lyft.291  Second, rideshare companies 
would have to exert more control over drivers.292  This might involve less flexible scheduling for 
drivers.293  Finally, rideshare companies may have to pare back their workforce to accommodate 
the additional costs of employment.294 
VI. Conclusion 
While ordinary surge pricing erodes consumer trust in rideshare companies, artificial surge pricing 
will likely heighten this effect, expose rideshare companies to litigation, and further discourage 
people from becoming rideshare drivers.  Even if the status quo is the most attractive choice for 
now, it may not be the most sustainable long-term option.  Rideshare companies can and should 
get ahead of their labor problems by proactively meeting drivers’ economic needs.  Earning (or re-
earning) drivers’ trust is essential to ensuring continued rideshare growth.295  At minimum, 
rideshare companies should increase drivers’ take-home pay.  Ultimately, rideshare companies 
will choose their path forward by weighing their tolerance for risk of antitrust liability against the 
costs of paying drivers more, giving them benefits, or employing them.  
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